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World Bank.THE POLITICS OF MONETARY SECTOR COOPERATION  AMONG THE
ECONOMIC COMMUHNITY  OF WEST AFRICAN STATES MEMBERS
INTRODUCTION
The treaty setting up the Economic Community of West African States
(ECOWAS)  was signed on May 28h 1975 in Lagos, Nigeria.' The aim of the
Organisation is to promote co-operation and integration among member states in various
fields of economic activity including monetary and financial matters. 2 In fact monetary
'  The  signatories  to the treaty  were:  Benin  (formerly  Dahomey),  Burkina  Faso (Formerly  Upper  Volta),
Cote  d' Ivoire,  Gambia,  Ghana,  Guinea,  Guinea-Bissau,  Liberia,  Mali,  Mauritania,  Niger,  Nigeria,  Senegal,
Sierra  Leone  and  Togo. Cape  Verde,  the sixteenth  state,  later  joined  the Organisation  in 1977  (Kufuor,
1994,  p.60).
2  Other  areas  of interest  include:  the elimination  as between  the member  states of customs  duties  and other
charges  of equivalent  effect  in respect  of the importation  and  exportation  of goods;  the abolition  of
quantitative  and administrative  restrictions  on trade  among  member  states;  the establishment  of a common
customs  tariff  and  a common  commercial  policy  towards  third  world  countries;  the abolition  as between
member  states  of the obstacles  to the free  movement  of persons,  services  and capital;  the harmonisation  of
the agricultural  policies  and  the promotion  of common  projects  in the member  states,  notably  in  the fields
of marketing,  research  and agro  industrial  enterprises;  and  the implementation  of schemes  for  the  joint
development  of transport,  communication,  energy  and other  infrastructural  facilities  as well as the
evolution  of a common  policy  in  these  fields (Articles  2 of the 1975  ECOWAS  Treaty).
2co-operation is generally seen as an important cornerstone  in the integration effort of
regions (Asante, 1996,  p. 1). It was in pursuance of this objective that the West African
Clearing system was established in 1975. In 1987, ECOWAS' monetary co-operation
program was adopted with the long term objective of establishing a single monetary zone
which would be characterised by the use of a common convertible currency, managed by
a common central bank and supported by a convertibility  guarantee arrangement with an
appropriate external body. 3 Potential benefits of such a system include: the possibilities
of reaping the benefit of economies of scale in monetary management; greater efficiency
and rational use and allocation of scarce human, material and financial resources; the
facilitation of intra regional trade and payments transactions as the use of a common
currency could effectively create a single regional market over a wide geographical area
of sixteen countries spanning 6,259,000 square kilometres  with a population of over 220
million people; 4 the spin off effect of the use of a single monetary zone will facilitate
greater inflow of foreign capital and stem capital flight as a result of improved credibility
of the region in international monetary and financial circles; the elimination of the current
widespread illegal speculative cross border currency trafficking activities with its price
distortions that encourage smuggling activities; and savings in the use of foreign
exchange involved in intra regional trade and payment transactions. 5
Interestingly,  eight francophone countries, which are all members of ECOWAS,
with the active backing of France, already have in place a single monetary zone and are
currently enjoying some of the above benefits. 6 For instance, the Central Bank of West
member  states  of  the  obstacles  to the  free  movement  of  persons,  services  and  capital;  the  harmonisation  of
the agricultural  policies  and  the promotion  of common  projects  in the member  states,  notably  in the fields
of  marketing,  research  and  agro  industrial  enterprises;  and  the  implementation  of schemes  for  the  joint
development  of transport,  communication,  energy  and  other  infrastructural  facilities  as well  as  the
evolution  of a common  policy  in  these  fields  (Articles  2 of the  1975  ECOWAS  Treaty).
3  In  the  short  run,  the  programme  was  supposed  to facilitate  regional  trade  transactions  by  improving  and
strengthening the multilateral regional payments and clearing system of the West African Clearing House.
In the medium term, it was supposed to achieve  regional currency convertibility through the more liberal
use of national currencies in intra regional trade transactions at market related exchange rates.
4  See World Bank (1998), for some general statistics on ECOWAS member countries.
5A  major potential cost of a single monetary zone is the lack of autonomy,  by individual  states, over the
use of key monetary policy instruments such as exchange rates and interest rates in a supra national
authority (ECOWAS, 1987).
3African States (BCEAO), established in 1962, is the sole central bank for these
francophone West African countries. It has the sole right of currency issue throughout the
West African member states and it is responsible  for the management of the monetary
policy of member states. The BCEAO also defines the regulations applicable to banks
and financial institutions and ensures the supervision of their activities. In this respect,
the Banking Commission, created in 1990, and chaired by the Governor of the BCEAO,
is responsible for the organisation and supervision of the banking system of member
states. By contrast, their anglophone neighbours, at least until recently, have shown little
sign of convergence and co-operation. 7
This paper attempts to explain why monetary co-operation and integration has
been difficult to achieve among ECOWAS member states. It shows how different interest
groups, both members and non-members  of ECOWAS,  have over time influenced
policies and positions in various ECOWAS member states. Unfortunately, most
negotiations for co-operation among ECOWAS  member states have excluded the most
powerful stakeholder- France. Furthermore,  we show that the francophone member states
have a much better monetary co-operation and integration  programme, mainly because of
the active support and participation of France in negotiations,  mediation and consensus
building. Unfortunately, Nigeria, which has been the main force behind regional
integration along bilingual lines in West Africa, has a different agenda from France.
Indeed its promotion of a bilingual economic grouping in West Africa was, in part, an
attempt to reduce the influence of France in the region. France is therefore unlikely to
allow economic integration along the Nigerian lines. The fact that Nigeria remains a
weak state, politically and economically,  does not help matters. The choice for the
francophone West African countries is therefore between closer ties with France on the
one hand, which have overtime provided development aid, ensured currency
convertibility and guaranteed  monetary stability in these francophone countries, and
Nigeria on the other, which currently cannot do any of the above for itself talk less of
6  The countries are: Benin, Burkina Faso, Cote d' Ivoire, Mali, Senegal, Niger, Togo and Guinea Bissau.
7  In January 2001, the Anglophone ECOWAS countries  (Nigeria, Ghana, Sierra Leone, Liberia and
Gambia) and Guinea established a West African Monetary Institute (WAMI) with headquarters in Accra
Ghana. WAMI is supposed to help its member countries to establish a common monetary zone, a common
4assisting its neighbours. Under such circumstances,  it is unlikely that ECOWAS will
make any real progress in the near future.
ORIGINS OF MONETARY CO-OPERATION  IN WEST AFRICA
Financial and monetary sector co-operation among some of the current members
of the ECOWAS predates post independence  economic integration efforts in the region.
With the imposition of colonial rule, the various colonial governments soon put in place
economic and political systems for the smooth functioning of their colonies. An essential
part of this process was the institution of an orderly financial and monetary system. In
British West Africa, for instance, legislations  were promulgated demonetizing several of
the existing currencies in an attempt to make the British currency supreme (Uche, 1999,
p.670). Furthermore, the geographical proximity of the colonies created opportunities for
economies of scales in monetary transactions in the region. For instance, the monetary
policy management of the four British West African Colonies was administered by the
West African Currency Board (WACB) which was established in 1912 and head-
quartered in London. 8 This body was charged "to provide for and to control the supply of
currency in the British West African Colonies, Protectorates  and Trust Territories." In
practice, however, the WACB was no more than an automatic money exchange
organisation issuing as much local currency as the banks wanted to buy for sterling and
vice-versa. It was therefore not in a technical sense a monetary authority. Such a trans-
colony organisation ensured that the Colonial Office developed similar policies with
respect to the colonies in the region. Commercial interests also developed along similar
lines. For instance, the first bank to be established in the region was the Bank of British
West Africa (BBWA). This bank maintained offices in all four colonies where it adopted
similar administrative and operational  policies. With a common currency and similarity
in banking institutions, one would have expected the level of co-operation and indeed
integration among these colonies to be high. After all, currency convertibility problems
could not in any way hamper inter colony trade in the region. The predominant financial
institutions then in existence could also have facilitated such trade since they maintained
central bank and a common currency by 2003. An analysis of this recent and still unfolding development is
beyond the scope of this paper.
5branches in all the colonies of the region. None of these benefits were realised. This was
because the development of inter colony trade was not the aim of colonisation. The
colonial masters were more interested in developing these colonies for the production of
raw materials for their factories and as possible markets for their finished products
(Manu, 1989, p.5). In other words, the Colonial Government designed the currency board
system not because they were interested in closer co-operation among their West African
colonies, but because there was immense potential for it to reap economies of scale
benefits from such a system. It made economic sense to administer these geographically
proximate colonies through one currency board which was head-quartered in London.
Inter colony integration therefore could only have been an incidental benefit of the
currency board system and not its objective. This argument is further supported by the
fact that the colonial Government did very little to promote the development of inter-
colony infrastructure in the region. Effort was concentrated on opening up large tracts of
hinterland and linking them to the coasts rather than linking colonies. It is thus not
surprising that inter colony trade at the time remained insignificant while Europe
remained the major trading partners of all the West African colonies (Ahmed, 1992, p.63;
Diallo, 1978, pp.63-4).
All this however started to change with the attainment of political independence.
Africans in general saw the WACB system as the financial hallmark of colonialism.
Doing away with the system was therefore an essential part of becoming independent. In
1957, the Gold Coast (Ghana) pulled out of the WACB and established its own Central
Bank and its own currency. Nigeria followed suit in 1959, Sierra Leone in 1963 and the
Gambia in 1971. Without a well developed political and economic system, most of these
central banks fell under immense pressure to expand their money supply without
necessarily expanding their reserves. All the safeguards against such pressures included
in the foundation central banking regulations of these colonies, which Britain had an
input in, either disappeared or were simply not being obeyed. The result was currency
inconvertibility and high inflation (Uche, 1997, p.153).
Independence also brought changes to the structure of the commercial  banks then
in existence. Many of the newly independent African states were suspicious of these
8  The colonies were: Nigeria, Gold Coast (Ghana), Sierra Leone and Gambia.
6foreign banks which were seen as agents of colonisation.  These banks, mainly registered
and head quartered abroad, had come into existence to service the needs of the British
commercial interests during colonial rule (Uche, 1998, p.240). They therefore did not aim
to serve the interests of the Africans. This was interpreted in several African circles as
evidence of discrimination. Newly independent  African countries were therefore
suspicious of many of these banks and, over time, some became indigenized. In Nigeria
for instance, the Government compulsorily acquired 40 percent of the three main banks in
1973. By 1977, the Government had increased its share holding in all foreign banks to 60
percent. 9 Such policies severely hampered the ability of these banks, which were the
industry leaders, to provide effective leadership for the industry and protect the interest of
the sector.
Regional integration is an example of where this policy failed. Financial
institutions could have played a key role in promoting the process. Strong, independent
financial institutions could be at the forefront of facilitating intra-regional trade by
encouraging the various governments  to harmonise banking regulations, establishing
correspondent banking and even opening branches in other ECOWAS member states. In
fact, even the branches opened across colonies during the colonial era were all forced to
become distinct legal entities or wind up all in the spirit of indigenisation. Even after the
establishment of ECOWAS, regulations in the four British West African countries still
preclude financial institutions operating branches in sister countries. In Ghana, the
Gambia and Nigeria, regulatory authorities prefer banks to be registered locally as
distinct legal entities before they can commence operations. The effect of indigenisation
and the independent banking regulations in the former British West African colonies has
been to reduce the hitherto close links between financial institutions in these countries.
Branches of BBWA, for instance, were now forced to become distinct legal entities with
9 Government  at the time, argued  that "Experience  has shown,  through history, that political
independence  without  economic  independence  is but an empty  shell.  The validity  of this statement  derives
from  the fact that the interests  of foreign  private  investors  in the Nigerian  economy  cannot  be expected  to
coincide  at all times and in every  respect  with  national  aspirations.  It would  be naive,  indeed  dangerous  to
hope that in the process of industrial  development,  a set of national objectives  will automatically  be
achieved  by their mere  declaration.  A truly independent  nation  cannot  allow its objectives  and priorities  to
be distorted  or frustrated  by the manipulations  of powerful  foreign  investors.  It is vital, therefore, for
Government  to acquire and control on behalf of the Nigerian Society,  the greater  proportion of the
productive  assets  of the country"  (Second  National  Development  Plan, 1970,  p.289).
7independent board of directors and management. Government control of these institutions
thus reduced their ability to effectively champion regional co-operation in the sector.
Furthermore, the indigenization  process did not aim at promoting regional
integration and co-operation. For instance, the Nigerian Enterprises Promotions Decree
(NEPD) of 1972 bestowed no special privileges to the citizens of other ECOWAS
member countries with respect to ownership of Nigerian enterprises. In other words,
citizens of Ghana, Sierra Leone, and the Gambia were also classified with Europeans as
foreigners.'0 The 1977  NEPD Decree retained this provision despite the fact that
ECOWAS had come into existence.  11 This is not to say that ECOWAS does not
encourage private sector initiative as a tool for regional integration. In 1985, for instance,
The Ecobank was established with the full support of ECOWAS and the Federation of
West African Chambers of Commerce  (Asante, 1998, p.8). It is currently owned by
individuals and institutions from fourteen West African countries and is currently present
in six countries. The objective of this bank include, among others, to facilitate regional
transfers, payment, and trade. Despite the laudability of its objectives and support from
ECOWAS, the bank enjoys no privileges and exemptions and usually faces exchange
control and regulatory difficulties in its operations (Ekpe, 1997, p. 1  69). Thus, although
banks now operate in more than one of these countries, they remain distinct legal entities.
Most of the advantages that can accrue from economies of scale and geographical
proximity are therefore lost.
The francophone West African countries also had a somewhat similar pre-
independence history when compared with their British counterparts. For most of the
French colonial rule, these colonies were organised under one colonial administration as
the French West African Federation. By thel93O's, France had undertaken to issue
currencies in each colony that would be firmly linked to the French Franc. Many of these
10  The  only  exceptions  were  purely  on  the  basis  of  reciprocity  and  residency.  For  instance,  he NEPD
Decree  of 1972  defined  a Nigerian  citizen  to include:  "any  person  of  African  descent  not  being  a citizen  of
Nigeria,  who  is a national  of  any  country  in Africa  which  is  a member  country  of  the  Organisation  of
African  Unity,  and  who  continues  to reside  and  carry  on  business  in Nigeria,  if the  country  of  which  he is a
national  also  permits  citizens  of  Nigeria  to establish  and  operate  businesses  or enterprises  in the  country  on
the  basis  of reciprocity"  (section  16).
S  see  section  23.
8currencies in the French African colonies  were subsequently consolidated into "le  franc
des Colonies  Francaises d'Afrique" (CFA Francs). These CFA Francs were issued by
Caisse Centrale de la France d 'outre mer [CCFOM, the Central Bank for Overseas
France]. The objective for setting up this broad franc zone included (i) convertibility into
French Francs at a fixed parity; (ii) free capital mobility throughout the zone; (iii) pooling
of most foreign exchange reserves at the French treasury; (iv) the establishment of a
common trade and financial policy vis a vis the rest of the world and; (v) guarantee of
convertibility by France through the establishment of "operations accounts" for each
colonial central bank with the French Treasury (Boughton, 1991, pp.1-2). By 1958, most
of the French colonies had become autonomous  within the French West African
Federation. Only Guinea opted for complete political independence in the Gaullist
referendum held that year.12  Even with the 1958 political developments, the degree of
economic integration among these former French colonies was still close. It was only
with the advent of political independence of these former French colonies (1960), when
the federation broke up into independent countries,  that barriers to trade and movement of
factors of production began to emerge (Manu, 1989,  p.4). With political independence,
several attempts at forming a pan-francophone  body in the region failed. This was mainly
because France opposed the formation of any strong federation in the region. In 1959, for
instance, France successfully  blocked the establishment of a potentially strong federation
comprising of Senegal, Benin (then Dahomey) and Burkina Faso (then Upper Volta). The
post-independence influence of France in the region has been explained thus:
Dependent states can only with considerable  sacrifice oppose the pressures of
a hegemonial power- in this case the former metropole, France. To the extent
that French decision-makers  did not desire to seek the reappearance of these
Federations, and to the extent that they provided positive inducements and
reinforcements, as well as negative sanctions,  with a view to influencing  the
outcome, their reconstitution was unlikely (Mytelka, 1974, p.299).
12  According to the Economist: "Spurred on by an ambitious trade union leader, Ahmed Sekou Toure,
Guineans voted in a 1958 referendum to reject an offer by France,  the colonial power, of autonomy within
the French Community, leading to Independence. A furious President de Gaulle, granted immediate
Independence, pulled out all French advisers, cancelled all aid and told French officials to bring back all
movable equipment including, it is said, light bulbs" (The Economist, 1995,  p.108).
9It is thus not surprising that all the regional bodies that emerged in the post independence
West African francophone zone of the 1960s  were either loose affiliations or simply  non
functional. One such body was the broad over arching political association, Union
Africaine et Malgache  (UAM), which was established in 1961. This body was later
transformed into the Organisation Commune  Africaine et Malgache (OCAM).
Membership was open to all francophone African countries which had signed co-
operation agreement with France.
Another such ineffective body was the Union douaniere des etats de l 'Afrique
Occidentale (UDAO). 13 Signatories to the Treaty, which was signed in Paris (1959), were
Cote d' Ivoire, Dahomey, Upper Volta, Niger, Senegal, Mali and Mauritania. The
objective of this regional body was to redistribute  the customs duties which the coastal
states collected on transit trade with the landlocked  members (Bach, 1983, p. 608). This
body however failed to achieve its objective.' 4 The interest of France at the time was not
in promoting intra regional trade among francophone West African countries. Rather, it
was more interested in promoting its own trade with the various francophone countries in
the region. The same trade related motivations was behind the French support for the
establishment of BCEAO in 1962.'5 This eliminated  currency restrictions in the trade of
these francophone countries with France.
Perhaps because of their different colonial  histories, it is not surprising that there
was very little economic relationships, at least in the formal sense, between francophone
and anglophone West African countries. Early post independence  private sector attempts
to promote regional co-operation in West Africa could only thrive along colonial lines. In
1963, for instance, the Chamber of Commerce of Sierra Leone and the Lagos Chamber of
Commerce and Industry championed  the formation of the Federation of West African
Chamber of Commerce. One of the objectives of this organisation was to promote the
13  This body later metamorphosed into the Union douaniere des Etats de 1' Afrique  de 1' Ouest
(UDEAO).
14  Francophone leaders felt that the failure of UDEAO was mainly "because it was concerned with
technicalities of customs arrangements  rather that with the real issues of economic development  and
regional integration" (West Africa, 70h  May 1973, p.594).
15 All the BCEAO member states belonged to the West African Monetary Union (WAMU) which was
formed in the same year. BCEAO was responsible  for the management of the monetary policy of the
WAMU member states.
I0establishment of an economic community  and a common market in the West African
region and to encourage the speedy re-establishment of supra-national commercial
institutions. Despite good intentions, this association could not break the colonial barrier
and only operated within the confines of British West Africa. According to one of the key
players in this private sector initiative:
Such was the formidable  psychological inhibitions of the immediate post-
independence era in the region, that the thought of both the French speaking
(francophone) and English speaking (anglophone) countries being brought
officially under the same umbrella of economic co-operation  was virtually
impracticable, in spite of the enormous exchange of goods and immigration
that was taking place unofficially. It was common knowledge that a brisk
trade went on, for instance, between Nigeria, the Republic of Benin and
Togo; between Togo and Ghana; between Senegal and the Gambia; and
between Sierra Leone and Liberia (Fajemirokun, 1976, p.8).
Political will on the part of the government of the member countries was important if any
meaningful progress was to be made towards breaking down this barrier. Unfortunately,
it has not been easy for West African countries to find the political will to help promote
the development of a bilingual economic grouping in the region.
THE POLITICS OF REGIONAL CO-OPERATION
Regional integration arrangements  are far more than economic ideals. Politics
have been a major reason behind such integration schemes like the European Union,
North Atlantic Free Trade Association (NAFTA), The Association of South East Asian
Nations (ASEAN) Free Trade Area and the Southern African Development Community
(SADEC) (Schiff and Winters, 1998b,  p.273). It is generally  believed that regional
integration arrangements can serve as an important political tool in three main ways.
First, they can help stabilise neighbouring  countries and thus reduce the probability that
emigrants and indeed bloodshed will flow across international  borders. 16 Secondly, such
16 In NAFTA, for instance, by pulling in the 90 million Mexicans into a formal arrangement, the USA is
hoping  to control  more  effectively  the  illegal  movement  of  the  millions  of  migrants  across  the  2000  miles
common border which is unpolicable. There are demographic studies that show that by 2025,  if current
trends continue, the Mexican population in California  could be in excess of 66 percent.
11regional integration arrangements  can help prevent outside threats to member nations. 17
Finally, regional integration arrangements  between previously antagonistic states can
help to reduce tension and better the relationship between such countries. However, for
regional integration to be effective, especially if it is promoted on political grounds, one
of the member countries must be willing to subsidise the scheme, at least in the short run.
Such subsidies provide the useful incentive for other weaker member states to join the
scheme. Where, however, there is higher opportunity costs for participating in such
politically influenced regional integration, it is unlikely that such a scheme will be
successful (Schiff and Winters, 1998a, p. 1  86). Attempts at regional integration in the
West African sub region provides evidence that supports  the above theory.
The poor record of economic integration in West Africa can be traced to the
colonial history of the region. Before the scramble for Africa and the enforcement of
artificial barriers in the region, trade flourished among the various tribes in the region.
Throughout the area of what is now designated West Africa, long distance trade existed
in the pre-colonial period. For instance, traders in Katsina (now Northern Nigeria) used to
take donkey loads of tobacco as far as 250 miles north into what is now Niger and use the
proceeds to take stock down to what is now Southern Nigeria to buy kola nuts to take
North again.  1 8 Unfortunately, the partitioning of Africa did not occur in any systematic
way. The four main British Colonies in West Africa do not share any common boundary
with each other. The advantages that can be got from geographical proximity are
therefore limited. On the other hand, they all share common boundaries with former
French colonies. This has led to the deterioration of even the economic  relationships that
existed between such territories before the imposition of colonial rule. The erection of
artificial boundaries has greatly hindered trade and the promotion of different cultures in
these geographically close territories has further widened the political and ideological
divide.
'7 In the case of SADEC, for instance, co-operation  arose because anti apartheid front-line states wanted to
protect each other from the juggernaut of racist forces of destabilisation,  economic sabotage and war that
were engineered from South Africa.
18 West Africa, 30th June 1975, p.738.
12Even where it makes economic sense for geographically  proximate countries to
have closer economic ties, political considerations  have prevented or, at least, limited the
scope of such arrangements. Landlocked  Niger Republic is an example. Its colonial
heritage has made it difficult for the country to develop its economic relationship with its
most viable neighbour (at least, in terms of market size): Nigeria. After the country
gained autonomy from France, in 1958, it soon became a member of UDAO in 1959. As
has already been mentioned, the objective of UDAO was to redistribute the customs duty,
which the coastal states collected on transit trade with the landlocked members. This
body was however largely inoperative throughout its lifetime. At the time, there was no
immediate need for a hegemonial power to help promote regional co-operation along
colonial lines. France was quite happy with the then existing system which allowed it to
maximise trade with its former colonies. The CFA Franc, which had guaranteed
convertibility  and which was common to the francophone West African states, helped
ensure the achievement of this objective. Trade and economic relationships between the
anglophone and francophone West African countries did not bother France since such
relationships did not go contrary to their interests.
All this however changed during the Nigerian civil war (1967-1970). The support
of France for seceding Biafra was a threat to the Nigerian Government. More worrying
was the fact that France used some of the francophone West African countries as a base
for aiding Biafra. This was perhaps the main reason why a 1969 meeting of Nigerian
ambassadors recommended that:
Lagos [should] seek to undermine OCAM's solidarity by strengthening
bilateral ties with Nigeria's francophone neighbours and by promoting the
creation of a new bilingual economic grouping in West Africa that would
supplant OCAM and open new markets for Nigeria's industrial products. 19
In other words, although a bilingual economic grouping could yield economic benefits
for Nigeria, the main reason why the country championed the establishment of
ECOWAS was to ensure its political control of the region.
France was not happy with the Nigerian agenda. With all the francophone
regional groupings almost non-operational,  the establishment of a new body became
13viable. Under the influence of France, ideologically  divergent francophone West African
countries began discussing the need for a strong francophone  regional body. 20 This was
the origin of Communaute  ' economique  de l 'Afriquede l 'ouest (CEAO). According to the
then President of France -Georges Pompidou- such a francophone  grouping was
necessary "in order to counter-balance  the heavy weight of Nigeria."'"  Some
francophone countries however opposed the establishment of such a strong pro-colonial
regional body. For instance, Togo kept its distance from CEAO from the beginning. It
maintained an observer status and in May 1972  joined with Nigeria to create an embrayo
Common Market. Another country that resisted CEAO was Niger. Before the signing of
the CEAO treaty, Major Michel Alladaye, the then foreign minister of Niger, stated his
country's position:
So far, I have failed to discover  what good Dahomey has derived from
membership in OCAM and other such groupings.  At the same time, our
relations with Nigeria are based on concrete and pragmatic mutual interests. I
am going to the CEAO summit in view of examining what is there for my
country in this organisation, but we shall not be bound by sentimental ties,
leftovers from colonial days. 22
It was thus not surprising that the country opted to maintain an observer status in the
CEAO. The then Foreign Minister explained the country's position thus:
Since Ghana and Nigeria do not belong to the CEAO, Dahomey's
membership of this organisation would not have meant very much....  We
could not become a member of a community  from which Nigeria would be
absent. 23
'9 Quoted in Bach (1983, p.607).
20 Ironically, the leaders of Senegal and Cote d' Ivoire (the two most powerful countries in francophone
West Africa) disagreed on the nature of regional integration before the development of 1969.  According to
West Africa: "it was M. Houphouet-Boigny's "conversion"  to the idea of CEAO which gave it the
necessary momentum. In the past, he was accused  of being responsible  for the "balkanisation" of
francophone West Africa. He was known as one who shrank from large, ambitious and often unrealistic
groupings' (West Africa, 7th  May 1973,  p.5 94).
21 Quoted in West Africa (7th  July, 1972,  p.867).
22  West Africa, 14th  May 1973, p.631.
23  Quoted in Bach (1983, p.609).
14Despite the above seemingly tough stance and the fact that the country was genuinely
interested in reducing the influence of France, it was careful to balance such moves with
the need to maintain cordial relations with France in order not to compromise its vital
financial and technical assistance. Indeed the country was at the time displeased with the
unwillingness of France to develop their Uranium deposits as rapidly as planned owing to
the world over supply of uranium. 24 Past flirtations with Nigeria and Libya however
caused the country great difficulties in its relationship  with France. As far as France was
concerned, Niger was a strategic ally at the time. Besides France being Niger's main
European trading partner, French troops were based in Niger and the number of French
"co-operants" was the highest per inhabitant of any country in the area. 25
Despite Niger's geographical proximity to Nigeria, politics made it imperative
that the country remained suspicious of Nigeria. The President of the country once
asserted that:
Do not be surprised if we are swallowed up by Nigeria. Our National routes
are directed through Nigeria, our cattle are exported to Nigeria and many of
our people come from there. If we are swallowed up it will be as much your
fault for leaving us alone as it is ours. 26
France helped, in no small way, to fuel suspicion and discourage any close ties with
Nigeria. Opportunities for France to help promote and facilitate  Nigerian-Niger trade
were turned down. For instance, the request by Niger that transfer from Nigeria of
payments for cattle exports be made through French firms established in Nigeria in order
to facilitate money transfer from the sterling to the franc zone was rejected by France.
The resistance to the influence of France by these former francophone West
African countries was done with the explicit support of Nigeria. The country's oil
wealth, at the time, made it possible for it to engage in economic diplomacy in the region.
It was thus in a position to donate generously  and even subsidise some of the
francophone states. This was important if the country was to achieve its objective of
24  West Africa (7h July 1972,  p.867).
25  Ibid.
26 Ibid,  p.866.
15reducing the influence of France in the colony. Although Nigeria finally succeeded in
establishing a bilingual regional body (1975), the utilitarian value of such a body was
doubtful. In fact, the CEAO countries ensured that their right of free association among
themselves was explicitly recognised in the 1975 ECOWAS  treaty. 27 Nigeria therefore
failed in its bid to weaken the influence of France in the region. It is therefore not
surprising that the francophone divide till date remains an impediment to economic
integration in the region. In this regard, the 1992 report of the Committee of Eminent
Persons, set up to review the 1975 ECOWAS  Treaty, with the aim of recommending
ways of revitalising the institution, explicitly stated that:
the co-existence of various economic groupings  and other inter-
govemmental organisations  in West Africa does seriously hinder ECOWAS'
effectiveness  unless their activities are rationalised and consolidated  within
the framework of a single economic community (p.6).
This is unlikely to be acceptable to the francophone countries at least for now. If
anything, they have been strengthening  their regional body. In 1994, at the height of
troubled times, the member countries of the CFA Franc Zone made explicit their
intention to strengthen their political, economic and monetary solidarity and  reaffirmed
their commitment to the principles and stability that characterise the franc zone. 28 In fact,
their integration process has been reinforced with the establishment of the West African
Economic  and Monetary Union (WAEMU) in 1994.29
Their regional grouping is currently the strongest and most disciplined body in
the region (Macedo, 1985, p.1). Since 1962, as has already been mentioned, they have
had a common central bank which has the sole right of currency issue throughout the
27 See Article 59.
28  Joint Declaration of the Chiefs of States and Heads of Government  of the African Member Countries of
the UMOA and BEAC Area (Daker, January 11, 1994). Reproduced in IMF Survey (Special Supplement)
March 21 1994,  p. 18).
29  "The transformation in 1994 of the francophone  monetary union (WAMU) into an economic and
monetary union (WAEMU) caused quite a stir among the other ECOWAS countries. The reason given by
WAEMU for deepening this co-operation arrangement  was to have control over other national policies that
affect the common monetary policy, and also enhance the contribution  that a monetary union makes to the
economic performance of the individual countries. Since ECOWAS  has the same WAEMU objectives and
16West African member states and is responsible for the management of the monetary
policies of member countries. In 1990,  the Organisation established a Banking
Commission responsible  for the organisation and supervision of the banking system of
member states. So advanced are they in the process of regional integration that some
scholars are beginning to suggest that the French regional integration should be expanded
to absorb anglophone countries (see Soludo, 1995). Economically,  this makes sense.
Politically, however, it may be difficult for this to happen. Furthermore, even if
francophone and anglophone countries bury their political differences, there is no
guaranty that France will continue to subsidise such a system. After all there may be no
incentive for them to continue to do so. In fact the French support for the current system
is already waning and it may be no coincidence that this is happening at the time
Nigeria's economy is in shambles and the country is fast loosing its reputation as a
possible regional power.  Despite the advances made by these former French colonies in
the arena of monetary integration, intra CFA Franc Zone trade remains abysmal. For
instance, between 1990 and 1993, the intra CFA Franc Zone exports for Benin, Burkina
Faso, Cote d' Ivoire, Mali, Niger, Senegal and Togo averaged: 8%, 8.5%, 17.6%, 3%,
3.3%, 14% and 6.9% while their imports averaged 5.5%, 24.5%, 1.7%, 22.9%, 12.9%,
9.7% and 11.7%  respectively (Clement et al, 1996, p.40). The high intra CFA Franc Zone
import levels recorded by Mali and Burkina Faso, is likely due to their landlocked
geographical location.
Monetary integration in the region has been promoted by France not because it is
interested in intra CFA Franc Zone trade. Rather France is more interested in the
economies of scale benefits that accrues to it by centralising  her control of these former
West African colonies. For France, it makes better economic  and political sense to
negotiate with a central body rather than with several independent states. France is also
not interested in promoting intra ECOWAS trade. 30 The question however is whether
allowing France to dictate policies for them is really against the interest of the
francophone countries? It is difficult to proffer a simple answer to this question. There
already  had programmes  in the new areas,  it seemed  ECOWAS  was  not thought  to be capable  of moving
fast  enough,  because  of lack  of commitment"  (ECOWAS,  1997,  p.9).
30  See  the Guardian,  May  26 1998.
17are advantages and disadvantages with respect to the relationship of WEAMU countries
with France. Despite the above type of criticisms, it is the relationship of these WEAMU
countries with France that is responsible  for monetary stability and currency
convertibility in the region. The involvement of France has ensured sound monetary
management and prevented fiscal policy indiscipline in the region. From 1948 to 1994,
the CFA Franc maintained fixed  exchange rate arrangement  with the French Franc.
Even when it was devalued in 1994, it was also this relationship that ensured the smooth
management of the economic fallout of such devaluation. For instance France undertook
to: cancel a substantial portion of the debt of each country in the franc zone (F 25
Billion); contribute significantly  to funding the countries financing requirement under the
IMF adjustment programs and; establish a special development fund designed to improve
the living conditions of the people residing in disadvantaged  urban areas. 31
Furthermore, France has also been the single largest supplier of aid to the region.
For instance, between 1993 and 1994, over 75% of the bilateral aid to CFA Franc
countries came from France (Clement  et al, 1996,  p.59). Unfortunately Nigeria is
currently classified as one of the thirteen poorest countries in the world. It is therefore
clearly not in a position to subsidise any other country. In other words, it is unable to
provide the bait necessary for regional allegiance. The importance of a hegemon and the
need to consult all stakeholders cannot be over emphasised if regional integration is to
yield any meaningful result. The CFA Franc Zone has gained enormous international
respectability mainly because of the support of France. Such support is the main reason
why the CFA Franc is convertible and indeed has shown remarkable stability since it
came into existence. To ensure convertibility,  member countries of the zone deposit 65
percent of their gross foreign exchange reserves with the French treasury. France, in turn,
provides an unlimited amount of overdraft to these countries thus guaranteeing  the
convertibility of the CFA Franc (Hernandez-Cata  et al, 1998,  p. 1).
Such fixed parity relationships are however not always beneficial. In the 1  980s,
for instance, substantial appreciation of the French Franc with respect to other
international currencies made exports of the CFA Franc Zone countries less competitive.
This coincided with the substantial and prolonged drops in the world market prices of
3S  see IMF Survey  (Special  Supplement,  March  21 1994, p.2 0).
18these countries' principal exports like coffee, cocoa, cotton and petroleum. The result was
a deterioration of the terms of trade of these countries by almost 50 percent between 1985
and 1993 (IMF Survey Supplement, March 21,1994, p.1). Remarkably, no one country
could on its own solve the problem. All the internal adjustment measures adopted proved
ineffective. In fact, it was not until France, the hegemon of the system and one of its main
stakeholders, got involved that progress was made. An agreement to devalue the
conversion rate of the CFA Franc to the French Franc by 50 percent was signed by all the
countries on January 1994. All the countries were able to sign the treaty, despite its harsh
economic and social implications, mainly because France lent its support. This helped
cushion the adjustment process.
It is such support that makes it difficult for ECOWAS sponsored regional
integration programs to succeed. It will be difficult for the francophone countries to
abandon such time tested relationship with France for ECOWAS. Even the European
integration which one would have expected could alter the ability of France to sustain its
subsidies is now unlikely to change this relationship. In a recent meeting of the finance
ministers of France and the countries of the CFA Franc Zone, it was agreed that the co-
operation agreement linking France and the CFA Franc Zone will be maintained and that
France will continue to guarantee  the convertibility  of the CFA franc zone (Hernandez-
Cata et al, 1998, p. 7). In fact, the European integration  will further benefit the CFA franc
zone. It will, for instance, enhance the ability of these francophone African states to
attract investments from other member countries of the European Union. This is partly
due to the elimination of foreign exchange risks between the Euro and the CFA franc.
ECOWAS MONETARY INTEGRATION  PROGRAM
The idea of monetary integration in the West African sub-region pre-dates the
establishment of ECOWAS. In 1972, the Association  of African Central Banks set up a
Study Group to examine trade and monetary relations in the West African sub-region.
The report argued that the problems of intra-sub-regional  trade payments arise not so
much from the insufficiency of existing facilities for effecting payments as from the long
delays encountered in receiving payments. Such delays arise mainly because of balance
19of trade difficulties and scarcity of foreign exchange in member states. The report thus
concluded that:
the establishment of some type of payments arrangements  that would
facilitate prompt receipt of export proceeds by exporters would stimulate
intra-sub-regional  trade. 32
In 1973, the Association of  African Central Banks set up another Study Group to
recommend guidelines for the establishment  of a clearing arrangement between member
states of the West African sub-region. 33 Their report recommended  the following
operational modalities: membership of the clearing house should be made optional;
payments for transactions among BCEAO member countries, which already have an
agreement, should not be channelled  through WACH; all intra sub-regional  transactions,
except inter- Government grants and loans, should be channelled through WACH;
payments for all goods, except re-exports 34 should be eligible for settlement through
WACH; all the accounting transactions of the clearing house be conducted in a West
African Unit of Account (WAUA) which is to be fixed to the International Monetary
Fund (IMF) Special Drawing Right at a given parity; the settlement period for all debts
under WACH should be one month and; each country should extend a global interim
credit line (based on a percentage of total intra sub-regional  trade) to the rest of the sub
region as a whole. WACH was subsequently established in 1975 mainly along the lines
of the above recommendations. The body had the following  objectives: (a) to promote the
use of the currencies of the members of the Clearing House for Sub-Regional  trade and
other transactions; (b) to bring about economies in the use of foreign reserves of the
members of the Clearing House; (c) to encourage the members of the clearing house to
32  Quoted  in  Association  of African  Central  Banks  (1973,  p.1).
33  Specifically,  this Study  Group  was  requested  to advise  on:  the unit of account  to be adopted  for agreed
transactions  which  should  form  the basis  of the clearing  arrangement;  the transactions  that should  form  the
basis of the arrangements;  the period  of settlement  under  the arrangements;  the system  of clearing  to be
adopted  and  the determination  of the central  bank  that should  effect  clearing;  the currency  in which
settlement  should  be effected;  the possibility  of encouraging  other  states  which  are  not members  of the sub-
regional  committee  to participate  in  the clearing  arrangement.
34  Export  goods  that originated  in a completely  finished  state  from  outside  the West  African  sub  region.
20liberalise trade among their respective countries and; (d) to promote monetary co-
operation and consultation among members of the clearing house.
Operationally, the payment mechanism of WACH was similar to the clearing
transaction by national central banks of cheques submitted by commercial banks, with the
clearing house acting like a national central bank and the clearing banks acting like
commercial banks. According to WACH:
... .the arrangement envisages that all transactions will go through
commercial and other banks as usual. The procedure is the commercial bank
which is effecting a customer's payment order in favour of another individual
in another country in the sub-region delivers the order to its central bank in
its own currency. The Central Bank in question notifies the Clearing House
and at the same time, sends the order to the Central Bank in the beneficiary's
country. On receiving the notification, the Clearing House credits the Central
Bank in the beneficiary's country and debits that of the country in which the
sender resides. Similarly, the Central Bank in the beneficiary's country, on
receiving the order, credits the beneficiary's commercial bank which will in
the final analysis effect payment to the beneficiary. 35
At the time WACH was introduced, a clearing house system made sense in the sub
region. There were 10 currencies, most of which were inconvertible, being used among
the 16 member states of ECOWAS. 36 These currencies fell under two main monetary
zones: the West African Sterling Area and the Franc Zone. The West African Sterling
Area comprised of Gambia, Sierra Leone, Ghana and Nigeria while the Franc Zone
comprised of Mauritania, Mali, Burkina Faso, Cote d' Ivoire, Togo, and Benin. At least
three of the countries in the region did not belong to any of these two monetary regimes
already mentioned (Guinea, Liberia and Guinea Bissau).
Within the franc zone, trade in goods and services were generally free from
controls and transfers of payments from such transactions were also not restricted. There
was also free movement of capital within the area. Trade with non francophone West
African states were however subject to varied degrees of restrictions. Capital movement
35  Quoted in Osagie (1979, p.227).
36  Senegal, Benin, Niger, Togo, Cote d' Ivoire, Burkina Faso (CFA Franc) Nigeria (Pounds, later Naira),
Ghana (Cedis), Gambia (Dalasi), Guinea (Sily, later Guinean Franc) Mali (Malian Franc), Sierra Leone (the
Leone), Liberia (Liberain Dollars), Guinea Bissau (Pesso, later joined the CFA Franc Zone), Cape Verde
(Escudo) and Mauritania (Quguiya).
21to such countries were also restricted. In the Sterling Area, however, the situation was
different. Every country had its own central bank, issued its own currency and followed
independent  monetary, exchange and credit policies. Although sometime loose
arrangements between central banks of these countries existed, especially for the
settlement of certain government accounts, like embassy accounts, there was generally no
co-ordination of policies (Association  of African Central Banks, 1973, p.4). With the
exception of the Gambia, there were also quantitative  restrictions on trade in goods and
services as well as capital movement within the West African Sterling Area. 37 A further
impediment to regional trade in the sub region as a whole was the fact that there was no
international exchange market. Intra regional transactions were usually routed through
London and Paris. Such practice involves dealing in two foreign currencies. For instance,
a trader in Sierra Leone who imports goods from Togo, will have to first of all convert his
Leone to Sterling, then convert the Sterling to Francs and finally to CFA Francs. Such
traders were therefore faced with multiple exchange rate risks and excessive transaction
costs (Ahmed, 1992, p.63; Mclenaghan et al, 1982,  pp.22-23). According  to WACH:
As there is no international  exchange market within the West African Sub-
Region, virtually all transfers between countries of the Franc Zone and those
of the former Sterling Area are rooted mainly through the correspondent
banks in London and Paris. Remittance charges for these transactions range
between 1/2  % and 1 %. This is additional to cable and postage charges. In
order to avoid these sort of charges, some countries within West Africa have
resorted to bilateral agreements (WACH, Undated,  p.5).
At the time, bilateral agreements existed between Togo and Mali, Nigeria and Niger,
Ghana and Mali; Upper Volta (now Burkina Faso), Niger, Togo and Dahomey (now
Benin); Sierra Leone and Guinea and Gambia and Senegal. 38 Though such bilateral
agreements help countries to save scarce foreign exchange and have the potentials to
increase trade between participating countries, they however have their limitations. For
instance, such agreements usually do not lead to the optimisation of trade mainly because
of the usually limited market scope. It was mainly because of the above limitations that
37  See also Mladek (1964a and 1964b) for the evolution and histories of these African currencies.
38  Many of these arrangements were never operational.
22WACH was established. In practice however, the introduction of WACH did very little to
promote trade in the sub region. This was perhaps because non of the WACH member
countries was willing to subsidise the system. Nigeria, with its oil wealth at the time, was
clearly in a position to do this. It however failed to do so.
The issue of the types of transactions to be passed through the WACH mechanism
is one example. The 1973 Study Group on Guidelines for the establishment of a clearing
house examined this issue and concluded that:
the objectives of a clearing arrangement are better served if as few exceptions
as possible are made as regards transactions that should be channelled
through the clearing arrangement. For this reason, it is suggested that
payments for all intra-sub-regional  transactions (trade and non-trade
transactions) should pass through the clearing system, except inter-
Government grants and loans (p. 15).
Despite this recommendation,  Nigeria refused, from the beginning, to channel trade in its
major foreign exchange earner-oil- through the clearing house mechanism. Despite the
fact that WACH had similar objectives with ECOWAS,  Nigeria refused to make this
important sacrifice. This can be explained by the 1975 change of Government in Nigeria.
The previous Government of General Gowon, with the explicit objective of undermining
the influence of France in the region and aided by its enormous oil resources, could
afford to be financially generous to its regional neighbours. Indeed some francophone
West African countries benefited from Gowon's generosity. For instance, in 1975,
Nigeria agreed to supply oil on soft credit terms to Cote d' Ivoire. 39 With the change of
govemment in July 1975 and the subsequent decline in Nigeria's oil wealth, scholars
began to question the wisdom in the enormous investments the country was making in
ECOWAS, which had no obvious immediate benefits. In this respect, it was asserted that:
The question is: What does Nigeria really want in return? The promise of an
expanded market for Nigeria's manufactured goods cannot be an overriding
motivation at this point because the country's own level of industrialisation is
low and its internal market is large and by no means exhausted. The idea that
through ECOWAS, Nigeria can undermine the political and economic
interest of France in West Africa is an illusion. French influence must first be
undermined in the francophone West African countires before ECOWAS can
39  See  New  Nigerian  (28J June 1975,  p.1).
23take off the ground. The other argument that Nigeria can use ECOWAS as a
rational outlet for its own external aid to sister African countries may have
had some validity when Nigeria had some "cash" from crude oil sales to
spare. Now that the country is in itself borrowing in international  money
market, the altruistic argument cannot be sustained. 40
Without any willing and able hegemonial  power in the region, it was not surprising that
intra regional trade only recorded minimal increases and the achievement of the objective
of monetary and financial integration, across colonial lines, is still far from reality. 41
IMPEDIMENTS TO INTRA REGIONAL TRADE
From the preceding section, it can be deduced that a major impediment to intra
ECOWAS trade is the problem of currency inconvertibility.  Prior to the establishment of
WACH, most of the ten currencies then in use in the region were inconvertible. Indeed,
this was one of the main reasons for the establishment of the WACH. Unfortunately, as
has already been argued, WACH did little to alleviate  the problem of currency
inconvertibility. The body was therefore not very successful in promoting intra regional
trade.
Another impediment to intra ECOWAS trade is the lack of political will by
member countries to implement regional agreements. Although numerous protocols and
agreements have been signed by ECOWAS  member countries since the establishment of
ECOWAS, most of them are at best redundant. Trade liberalisation is one of the areas
that have received immense attention, at least on paper. The origins of the trade
liberalisation scheme is embedded in the ECOWAS Treaty of 1975 which stated thus:
the Community shall by stages ensure: (a) the elimination as between
Member States of customs duties and other charges of equivalent effects in
respect of the importation and exportation of goods; (b) the abolition of
quantitative and administrative  restrictions on trade among the member state
40 Daily  Times  (May  6 1978,  p.19).
41  "The  biggest  challenge  in West  Africa  now is the emergence  of an undisputed  leader  of West  African
monetary  and  financial  integration.  There  are many  potential  candidates  but none  has yet clearly  emerged
to lead  the rest of the region  in the march  towards  a better  West  Africa  into  the 2  1t Century"
(Ouhoumoudou, 1997, p.8).
24[and]; (c) the establishment of a common customs tariff and a common
commercial policy towards third countries (Article 2).
Complete trade liberalisation was to take place within fifteen years from the definitive
entry into force of the 1975 ECOWAS  Treaty (article 12). In spite of the numerous
agreements and efforts made to encourage the expansion of regional trade through this
scheme, not much trade has been undertaken under the scheme (Kufuor, 1995, p.240).
This is mainly because all the relevant documents such as the Certificates of Origin and
the harmonised customs documents have not been universally introduced into the system.
It has been noted that:
The most immediate obstacles to intra-ECOWAS  trade are however the
administrative  hurdles and barriers. It is not enough to remove tariff and non-
tariff barriers. It is essential to ensure that the administrative procedures
necessary for the utilisation of any trade liberalisation  scheme are functioning
efficiently. So far, this has not really been the case. The fact that Certificate
of Origin remains a rare commodity, even after the TLS have commenced,
bears eloquent testimony to this. This obstacle is the most fundamental in the
sense that its existence shows either a lack of commitment  towards
liberalisation, and/or disorganisation  within the relevant bodies. The problem
is also the simplest to solve (Omorogbe, 1992, p.25).
It is therefore difficult to see how a country that cannot deal with simple administrative
obstacles can deal with more serious obstacles to regional trade and integration. The
result is that ECOWAS States are now generally known for their lack of political will to
implement their own decisions. Protocols and resolutions are not the only things that
ECOWAS member states do not respect. Even institutions set up to facilitate the
integration process have suffered similar fate. An example is the Fund for Co-operation,
Compensation and Development of the Economic Community of West African States
(ECOWAS Fund). 42
42  The Fund, established in 1976,  has the following objectives: to provide compensation and other forms of
assistance to member states which have suffered losses as a result of the application of the provisions of the
ECOWAS treaty; to provide compensation  to member states which have suffered losses as a result of the
location of ECOWAS enterprises; to provide grants for financing  national or community  research and
development activities; grant loans for feasibility studies and development  projects in member states;
guarantee foreign investments made in member states in respect of enterprises established in pursuance of
the provisions of the ECOWAS Treaty on the harmonisation of industrial policies; provide means to
facilitate  the sustained mobilisation of internal  and external financial resources for the member states of
ECOWAS and; to promote development projects in the less developed member states of ECOWAS (see
25Despite the noble objectives of the Fund, some member states  have consistently
failed to meet their obligations to it. There is a widespread lack of political will among
member states to make integration work. A substantial part of the Fund's share capital
remains outstanding to date while some member states have a poor loan repayment
record. 43 All these have contributed to the negative image of the fund and to its inability
to perform creditably. According to a former Managing Director of the Fund:
ECOWAS FUND has, for a number of years, been struggling hard in order
to survive. For that reason, it has regrettably failed to make the expected
impact on the economies of the Member States of the Community. As a
financial institution, the Fund's stock in trade is its operating capital.
But.. .due  mainly to persistent budget deficits since 1989, the institution's
operating capital stock has fallen to a precariously low level... .The
implication...is that the FUND is expected to depend solely on external
donors/lenders for resources to finance its lending operations. However,...
as evidenced by reports relating to arrears in respect of capital
contributions and loan repayments in particular, donors have not felt
comfortable to do business with the FUND. Inspite of this handicap,
approaches have been made to several prospective donors, but they have
invariably recoiled after scrutinising  our administrative structures and our
financial statements. I am sorry  to say that some have even been forthright
in voicing their doubts about the commitment  of ECOWAS Member
States to their own institution (Apea, 1997,  p.4).
Another popular reason for the unsubstantial  level of intra ECOWAS  trade is the
low level of industrialisation in the region. A consequence of this is the lack of
complementarity in the production profiles of the countries in the region. For instance,
most ECOWAS member states are producers of primary goods. The scope for
exchanging such goods with say, manufactured goods, is therefore limited in the region.
It is however important to note that despite its recurrence in the literature, the importance
attached to this factor may be over exaggerated.  For instance, trade flow studies have
identified 256 product groups with trade values of over $100,000 which are officially
Articles two of the Protocol Relating  to the Fund for Co-operation, Compensation and Development of the
Economic Community of West African States).
43 As at 1998, two ECOWAS member states had yet to pay up the first tranche of the capital called up since
1977. With regards to the second tranche of capital declared  due for payment in 1987, only five member
states have honoured all their obligations. Four member states have not made any payment while seven
member states have made only partial payments (Barthelemy, 1998,  pp.9-10).
26being both imported into the region and exported from it. The value of these imports in
1987 was $8 billion or over half of the region's world imports. More recently, a
programme of demand and supply surveys  was undertaken for some manufactured
products like fertilisers, paper products, sawn  timber and pharmaceutical products. This
survey identified producers in these product groups and found that there was substantial
export surplus and under utilised productive capacity which could be developed for
regional markets. It also identified potential importers of these same products from within
the region (ECOWAS, 1996,  pp.2-3).
Another hindrance to intra ECOWAS trade is the poor communication and
transportation system in the region (ECOWAS, 1996,  p.4; Omorogbe, 1992, p.24).
Perhaps because of colonial history, transportation  and communication  within the region
is very tedious and expensive. It is cheaper and easier to send a Courier message from
Lagos to London than from Lagos to Senegal.  This is so since it is usually faster to fly to
London than to fly to Dakar. Thus it is not unusual for intra ECOWAS mails to transit in
Europe. In terms of cost, for individual travel, a Lagos London ticket is in most cases by
far cheaper than a Lagos Dakar ticket. In fact, only Ghana Airways and Air Afrique
currently fly the Lagos Dakar route. Ghana Airways, which is usually more convenient,
flies only two times a week and stops over in Accra, Abidjan, Conakry and Banjul. Road
networks, which would have made ECOWAS travel cheaper, are not yet well developed.
Even where they are, corruption, bureaucracy  and criminal activities along some of the
borders escalate the cost in real terms.  44
Another factor that has impeded regional trade is the high level of poverty and
social deprivation in the region. Poverty continues  to ensure the paucity of infrastructure,
which is key to the promotion of intra regional trade. Most of the ECOWAS countries are
too consumed in trying to improve their indigent existence to start thinking about
regional integration. Most of the ECOWAS member countries have a per capita income
of less that $500, high level of illiteracy, low life expectancy (World Bank, 1998). These
conditions have made them overtly depend on external aid and loans for their survival.
44  I am relying on my recent experience travelling across West Africa for most of this information.
27They are therefore not in a strong position to pursue regional interests especially when it
goes against international interests. 45
A further impediment to regional trade is the near absence of a conducive
environment for legitimate trade to take place. Corruption and nepotism, widespread in
several of these countries, continue to constitute a stumbling block to the development of
legitimate trade. The level of corruption and criminal activities that take place along some
of the borders, especially land borders, is indescribable. On some of the borders, criminal
gangs operate alongside corrupt security agents. The Nigerian Benin (Seme) Border is a
classic example. Customs men and security agents, on both sides of the border, extort
money and steal from transiting persons. Transiting goods are also subject to the same
fate. There is little distinction between security men and criminals. Alongside these
'legitimate' borders is also a thriving illegal crossings  market. In fact, the hassles of
formal crossing continue to encourage more persons to take the illegal route. It may be
cheaper to smuggle duty free goods across such borders than to transport them through
the so called official borders. 46 It is generally  believed that corruption in the Nigerian
Society has been reflected in the activities of its borders. The corruption in the Benin side
of the Seme border is rather unfortunate. They claim that they are reciprocating what
their kit and kin suffer in the hands of Nigerian customs official. Such claims make sense
especially when you consider the fact that the land border crossing from Benin to Togo is
hassle free once you pay the flat bribe of 300 CFA francs for those with valid travel
documents and 500 CFA Francs for those without valid travel documents. In other words,
Nigeria's inability to tackle corruption at home is being exported abroad.
The introduction of WACH did little to alleviate most of the above problems.
There were also some WACH related operational problems that impeded trade. These
included the late settlement of WACH claims by some of the member central banks and
stringent payment procedures imposed  by some member states for WACH transactions.
The results of these drawbacks have been to discourage WACH transactions. The
45  It has been  suggested  that:  "the lower  the level of a member's  economy,  the greater  the vulnerability  to
external  political  and economic  influences  which  may  be detrimental  to ECOWAS  plans  and  goals"  (Daily
Times,  May 6 1978,  p.19).
46  In the course  of this research  the author  visited  6 West  Africa  countries  and  crossed  the land  borders
from  Nigeria  to Benin,  Benin  to Togo and  from  Togo  to Ghana.
28fortunes of WACH started to change for the worse in the mid 1  980s, when an increasing
number of ECOWAS member states started adopting various forms of Structural
Adjustment Programmes. This led to the relaxation of exchange controls,  the adoption of
market determined exchange rates and increased access to foreign exchange. This in turn
led to a drastic decline in the level of transactions channelled  through WACH mainly
because banks were no longer obliged to channel all intra regional transactions through
WACH. There was thus a drastic decline in WACH  transactions. For instance, the level
of clearing transactions channelled  through WACH fell from a peak of WAUA 224
million (1984) to WAUA 15 million (1990) (Asante, 1995,  p.2).  The 1989/90 WACH
Annual Report and Statement of Accounts asserted that:
During the financial year under review transactions channelled through the
West African Clearing House (WACH) declined for the sixth consecutive
year. All efforts to arrest the decline in transactions have so far proved
abortive. Anything short of a structural transformation of the member
countries economies cannot ensure the recovery and growth of intra-sub-
regional trade in West Africa which is a sine-qua-non for the growth of
WACH transactions (p.5).
It therefore became obvious that it was only a matter of time before WACH became
redundant and irrelevant. In 1991,  ECOWAS set up a study group to examine the
possibility of redefining the objectives and activities of WACH with the view of adapting
it to the economic trends in the sub region. 47 In October 1991 the committee
recommended that in the long run, WACH should be transformed into a specialised
agency of ECOWAS. This decision was adopted by the Governors in February 1992, and
approved by ECOWAS Heads of State in July 1993. This culminated in the establishment
of the West African Monetary Agency (WAMA) in 1994. WAMA was mandated to:
promote monetary co-operation and payment issues within the context of the economic
and monetary integration of the region; initiate and promote policies and programmes for
achieving monetary integration; facilitate the harmonisation and co-ordination of macro-
47  In detail, the Study Group was required to: "examine the causes of the decline in the level of transactions
channelled through the WACH mechanism  and make recommendations  in relation to the following options:
maintaining the status quo of  WACH and undertaking measures aimed at reversing the decline; broadening
the scope of activities of WACH; merging WACH with ECOWAS; converting WACH into a specialised
agency of ECOWAS."
29economic policies and structural adjustment  programmes of member states and; ensure
the establishment of a single monetary zone (Asante, 1995,  p.5).
In reality, ECOWAS  member states decided to go for deeper monetary integration
(single monetary zone) despite the fact that they failed to successfully  run a much simpler
scheme (clearing house). Despite the replacement  of WACH with WAMA, most of the
fundarnental  problems that had frustrated the activities of WACH remain ever present.
What ECOWAS did was simply to sweep them under the carpet. The major problem is
that most ECOWAS member states are weak in infrastructure,  economically and
politically. They represent some of the poorest states in the world. Among themselves,
they have done little to promote integration. This is mainly because the short term costs
of looking inwards could be high with little or no attendant short term benefits. For
instance, should regional co-operation  go contrary to the interest of non regional member
countries, some of these ECOWAS member states run the risk of losing development aid
and debt relief programmes on which their economies depend. On the other hand there is
no EGCOWAS  member country that is strong enough to act as a hegemon to its brother
states. The case of the francophone West African countries is an example. As has been
mentioned above, these countries continue to receive immense financial support, in the
form of economic and technical aid, from France. The majority of their trade is also with
France. Any ECOWAS based integration process that aims at promoting intra ECOWAS
trade is likely to do so at the expense of France. The question therefore will be whether
these francophone countries are willing to push a regional agenda at the expense of their
individual relationships with France?
EXTERNAL INFLUENCES AND ECOWAS INTEGRATION
Interestingly, most of the positive landmarks  in regional integration in the region
have come from outside ECOWAS. From the beginning, the establishment of ECOWAS
could not have been possible if Britain had not joined the European Union (1973).
Subsequently,  the EEC decided not to renew the Yaounde II Convention, a co-operation
agreement between EEC and the francophone Etats africains et malgache associes
30(EAMA), independent of any agreement with 'associable' states of the Commonwealth.
This.  led to the adoption of the Lome Convention in February 1975.48  According to Bach:
The adoption of the Lome convention in February 1975 was a decisive step
towards the formation of E.C.O.W.A.S., since it unified the legal framework
within which all the member-states  would maintain their extra-African
economic relations. For the francophone states, E.C.O.W.A.S.  no longer
represented a challenge to their ties with France. In several respects, the birth
of E.C.O.W.A.S. may be considered as a West African expression of the
changing relationship  established with Europe under the Lome Convention
(1983, p.6 10).
Even now, the little progress that has been made by member states towards economic
integration has been made mainly because of externally (International Monetary Fund)
imposed structural adjustment programmes. Admittedly, ECOWAS has in place a
comprehensive  programme to ensure economic  convergence among its member states.
The ECOWAS Monetary Co-operation Programme, for instance, agreed on the following
forms of macro economic indicators:  the maintenance of an annual exchange rate
variability of not more than 10 percent and the elimination of payment restrictions on
current account transactions; the maintenance  of a single digit inflation rate by member
countries; reduction in budget deficit / GDP ratios to 3 percent and; the maintenance of a
10 percent ceiling on central bank financing of Government  budget deficit (WAMA,
1997, p.11). These parameters are however similar to the structural adjustment principles
of the IMF.
From available statistics (1997 figures), modest progress has been made on most
of the above key elements of the ECOWAS Monetary Co-operation Programme. On the
issue of the exchange rate variability and the elimination  of payment restrictions on
current account transactions, for instance, Gambia, Nigeria, Guinea and Sierra Leone
48  This  Convention,  signed  on February  28th  1975  in Lome,  Togo,  is an economic  co-operation
arrangement  between  forty  six  states,  made  up  practically  of  the  whole  of independent  Africa  south  of  the
Sahara, six Caribbean countries and three groups of Pacific Islands, on one side, and the nine EEC
countries on the other side. Of the forty six African, Caribbean and Pacific (ACP) countries, nineteen were
before the Convention associated with the Common Market until January 1975 (under the Yaounde
Convention).  Twenty one of these ACP countries  were Commonwealth  member states. They were brought
into the agreement  because of the admission of Britain into the EEC. The remaining six countries were
African countries. They were invited into the agreement because  their economies were comparable with
those of the other ACP countries (Olofm, 1977,  pp.66-67).
31maintained relatively stable rates within the stipulated 10 percent margin of variability. 49
Exchange rate variability in the Gambia and Guinea has remained stable since the mid-
1980s and early 1990s  respectively. In 1997, Ghana, WAEMU  Group, Mauritania and
Cape Verde were outside the 10 percent margin of variability. Since 1992, Ghana has
remained outside the margins while the BCEAO group had a relatively stable exchange
rate variability until 1994 when there was a 50 percent devaluation of the CFA Franc.
Mauritania and Cape Verde have overall achieved a reasonable degree of monetary
policy stability. On the elimination of payment restrictions on current account
transactions, only the BCEAO countries, Ghana, Gambia, Guinea and Sierra Leone have
completely liberalised their current account transaction and are signatories to the IMF
Articles VIII Agreement. Cape Verde, Mauritania  and Nigeria have also completely
liberalised their current account transactions though they are yet to sign up to the IMF
Articles VIII. Liberia remains the only country in the region that has a fixed exchange
rate regime with a large black market premium (WAMA, 1998,  p.7).
The second form of macro economic indicators agreed by ECOWAS is the
reduction in the inflation rate of member countries to between 1 and 9 percent. Here
again, the community has recorded modest progress towards the achievement of the
above goal. At the end of 1997, only Ghana, Guinea Bissau, and Sierra Leone had not
achieved this objective. 50 The third form of macro economic convergence indicator
agreed by ECOWAS is the reduction in budget deficit / GDP ratios to 3 percent. By the
end of 1997, only the Gambia and Sierra Leone had not attained this requirement." The
last macro economic convergence  criteria agreed by ECOWAS was the imposition of a
10 percent ceiling on central bank financing of deficits by member countries. So far, only
Cape Verde and Ghana have enacted legislations  to incorporate such limits. In practice,
however, Benin Republic, Cape Verde, Gambia, Ghana Guinea Bissau, Mali and
Mauritania all achieved the ECOWAS recommendation  in1997. However, it is important
49 In Nigeria,  this  relative  stability,  which  is a recent  phenomenon,  is already  endangered.  The  practice,  by
the current  civilian  government,  of monetising  the extra  budgetary  revenue  from  windfall  oil prices,  has
negatively  impacted  on the exchange  rate  variability.  The  unending  civil  war in Sierra  Leone  is also
threatening  its recently  acquired  exchange  rate  stability.
50 The  statistics  for Liberia  are unavailable.
51  The 1997  statistics  for Liberia  and  Nigeria  is unavailable
32to note that most central banks observe their existing internal statutory requirements
which are usually different and not of the same basis as that of the convergence criteria
approved by ECOWAS.  There is thus a need to get countries to legislate  the ECOWAS
requirement without further delay (WAMA, 1997, p. I0).
Unfortunately, as has already been mentioned,  this modest progress towards
monetary integration in the West African sub region has not necessarily been at the
initiative of ECOWAS. Externally imposed SAPs have been more relevant in the
restructuring of these African economies. The downside of such external influences is
that they usually have other consequences.  In this respect, it has been noted that:
Unfortunately, these IMF sponsored Structural Adjustment Programmes
pursued by member states have been the most effective driving force
towards the harmonisation  of the economies within the sub-region. The
objectives of the SAPs, although quite compatible with those of the
ECOWAS Monetary Co-operation Programme,  have a global orientation,
rather than the integration of the sub-region. They therefore orient the
economies of the sub-region towards the major world economies who
have been our major traditional trading partners (WAMA, 1998, p.1).
In other words, although some may claim that the ECOWAS member states are
beginning to put in place the various macro economic policies necessary for sustainable
regional integration, these countries indeed have no control over these developments. As
already mentioned, the problem with IMF induced SAPs is that regional integration is not
one of their objectives. Instead, SAPs are usually market oriented and generally
discourage subsidies. In other words, countries are encouraged to seek out the best deals
in their economic transactions. If geographical  proximity offers any advantages in trade
and commerce, such should be taken advantage of. Where they don't, as sometimes is the
case in West Africa, countries are encouraged to seek for better deals outside their
geographical area. The idea of using subsidies to build up markets goes contrary to the
rules of SAPs.
Even on the political front, there has also been progress. Again, this has largely
been made possible by an external stakeholder- France. The frosty and suspicious
relationship between France and Nigeria, a major stumbling block towards effective
regional integration in West Africa, appears to be changing for the better. To the pleasure
33of France, Nigeria recently adopted the French language as its second official language.
This has led to enormous economic and political support, for Nigeria, from France. It was
therefore not surprising when the French Ambassador to Nigeria-Monsieur  Philippe
Peltier- recently asserted that:
The French President [Monsieur Jacque Chirac] has a new vision of Africa in
the 2  1 It century, in which Nigeria will play the principal role. 52
Perhaps Nigeria has finally realised that France is indeed a major stakeholder in the
region. Decisions on integration that exclude France are bound to achieve little results.
With such realisation and changes in attitude, there is hope for meaningful progress to be
made in the integration process of the region.
CONCLUSION
Despite much talk of regional integration and much legislation to that effect,
within ECOWAS, whatever sustainable progress towards integration has not come from
the efforts of ECOWAS. Rather, it has been externally induced, mainly from the IMF
imposed Economic Adjustment Programs. Although ECOWAS  have now adopted many
of IMF style adjustment programmes, many ECOWAS  member states obey them not
because of ECOWAS. Unfortunately,  regional integration is not the objective of such
IMF imposed programmes. The question therefore is whether monetary sector integration
is possible along ECOWAS lines and if so, who will be the benefactors? Under the
current circumstances, it is difficult to see how monetary integration will be possible
along ECOWAS lines. There is clearly no hegemonial power within the region to
subsidise the process. Nigeria has now proved beyond reasonable doubt that it is unable
to do this. There is also no incentive for the francophone  West African countries to forfeit
the benefits of their relationship  with France. The emergence of the European Monetary
Union will further enhance these benefits. Furthermore,  these poor countries of the sub
region have little to teach each other in terms of skilled labour acquisition and
industrialisation. Inadequate infrastructure  has also added to the difficulty of deriving
advantages from the geographical  proximity of ECOWAS member states.
34Despite the above limitations, the need for more meaningful regional integration
in West Africa is now even mnore  critical. This is especially so given the generally
deteriorating economic and political situation in the region. Indeed most global actors, led
by the current Secretary General of the United Nations, have now come to appreciate the
need to bolster the development and conflict  management capabilities of the region. A
strong and virile ECOWAS will, for instance, be able to provide the platform necessary
to effectively tackle civil wars, economic crisis and natural disasters in the region. This
will greatly reduce the human, material and political costs of such crisis to stakeholder
western countries and institutions. There is thus the need for all stakeholders in the region
to rethink their strategy with respect to the creation of a strong and virile regional
organisation in West Africa.
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